Compensation of bank CEOs increases after mergers, suggesting that executives may engage in acquisitions to enjoy size-related personal benefits (Bliss and Rosen, 2001). Alternatively, bank mergers can be viewed as the efficient assignation of merged assets to the managerial team best suited to realize merger gains.
We believe that consideration of alternative hypotheses based on managerial productivity and restructuring of managerial incentives merit investigation before resting on a conclusion of managerial empire building, however. For example, the economic forces that promote restructuring in the banking sector also seem likely to affect the marginal product of bank executives with the scarce expertise required to manage the restructuring process. In other words, just as the market for corporate control identifies and rewards optimal asset restructuring it also identifies and rewards executives best suited to manage restructured assets. Consequently, the process we contemplate is not one in which CEOs acquire other firms merely to exploit a labor market that appears to assign higher pay to managers of bigger firms. 2 Rather, we conceptualize a restructuring banking sector in which optimal asset configuration undergoes change and consequently identification and matching of skilled executives to firms is also dynamic. Managerial product increases after a merger since the organization is larger and more complex and more is demanded of the CEO. Talented CEOs benefit from this process because the value of their managerial skill is enhanced, confirmed, and put to the test by the merger process, not due to a windfall for putting themselves in the right place at the right time.
We believe such explanations require greater scrutiny before being dismissed in favor of the notion that CEOs engage in mergers as a ploy to increase their compensation.
Our analysis of changes in CEO compensation after prominent bank mergers appears consistent with restructuring of incentives to enhance managerial productivity. First, long-term compensation increases proportionately more than cash compensation, increasing the ratio of long-term to total compensation from a mean (median) of 28.9%
(35.3%) to 42.1% (43.0%). The increase in this ratio can be viewed as an enhancement of performance incentives because the ultimate value of long-term compensation, which includes stock options and other long-term incentive payouts, depends on future performance (Mehran, 1995) . In short, jointly observing higher pay and greater performance incentives is consistent with the notion that a newly merged bank requires and rewards greater managerial effort (Demsetz, 1995) .
We further test this hypothesis by examining the relation between changes in CEO compensation and gains from merger. The acquirer bank pays a premium for the target that reflects the anticipated gains from merger, and after the merger the CEO's efforts must be focused on realizing these anticipated m erger gains. In particular, sources of potential cost savings or revenue enhancements must be identified, assets and organizations restructured, etc. None of these changes or the requisite decisions will occur by themselves; managerial effort must be expended and managerial discretion carefully exercised. These new demands on the CEO should be accompanied by a compensation increase commensurate with potential merger gains, not mere changes in asset size. We therefore measure expected gains from merger a s the value-weighted change in market values of the target and bidder banks upon announcement of the merger. The value change at announcement can be viewed as the financial market's expectation of gains from organizational efficiencies, product and geographic diversification, cost savings, and revenue enhancements (Houston and Ryngaert, 1994;
Houston, James, and Ryngaert, 2001; DeLong, 2001). Under the hypothesis that greater managerial effort will be directed at realizing these merger gains, a positive r elation between changes in compensation and the financial market's assessment of merger gains would suggest efficient restructuring of managerial incentives.
Consistent with this prediction, we show that changes in CEO compensation after mergers are positively related to expected merger gains. This inference is confirmed in multivariate analysis that also controls for bidder bank size, target bank size, and other bank and manager-specific variables. Specifically, we find that the changes in the log value of compensation are positively related to expected merger gains and, in the case of cash compensation, changes in operating profits. This relation appears economically significant; for a CEO with median before merger cash (total) compensation, a merger with expected value gains at the 3 rd quartile predicts a $246 thousand ($463 thousand) larger pay raise subsequent to the merger than if the merger gains were at the 1 st quartile.
In contrast to Bliss and Rosen, we do not find a statistically significant positive relation between changes in compensation and target assets.
Based on these results we are inclined to view increases in CEO compensation after bank mergers as indicative of restructured incentives for CEOs required to focus their talents on the realization of merger gains in a more complex organization. It seems less persuasive to argue that these changes in compensation represent windfall benefits to bank CEOs who are undeservedly rewarded for increasing bank assets via merger. Of course, this i s not to say that every management-proposed merger makes sense or that every post merger pay raise is well deserved. On balance, however, general patterns in CEO compensation following bank mergers appear consistent with a market for corporate control that rewards efficient asset consolidation and a managerial labor market that rewards managerial productivity.
In section I we review the impact of mergers on CEO compensation and develop hypotheses to explain why we might observe these effects. In section II we describe our sample of bank mergers. In section III we summarize data on levels and changes in CEO compensation of merging banks. In section IV we provide results from multivariate analysis of changes in CEO compensation. We offer a conclusion in section V.
I. FIRM SIZE, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, AND MERGERS
A cross-sectional relation between firm size and executive compensation is a ubiquitous empirical finding (e.g., Rosen, 1992; Jensen and Murphy, 1990) . Labor market theory suggests that this relation may merely be the outcome of matching more talented executives with larger firms in which their managerial product is maximized (Rosen, 1992 (2000) reports that announcement returns to bidders are significantly less negative in the 1990s when compared to earlier periods. Second, compensation data on proxy statements is better recorded in the 1990s compared to earlier time periods, and proxy statements themselves are more readily available. Table I and Table II provide summary data on the sample mergers. Panel A of Table   I details summary statistics by year including the number of mergers, as well as the mean, median, and total value of these mergers. From this Table, it is evident that the value of these mergers increases throughout the 1990s. Moreover, the number of unique bidders shows that, for these larger mergers, a unique bidder firm undertakes about 87% of the mergers. In other words, very few large bank mergers are contested events. 7 Table II examines the levels and relationship of the assets of target and bidder firms. We implement standard event study methodology to estimate the wealth effects for bidders, targets, and combined bidders and targets. Returns are calculated over a sevenday event window ( -5, +1) around the initial merger announcement date. Geometric cumulative abnormal returns are found by multiplying the product of that day's abnormal return times the previous cumulative product, ((1+ar i )*(1+ar i-1 )), and t hen subtracting one from the final product, where ar i is the ith day abnormal return and ar i-1 is the cumulative product of all the days abnormal returns prior to the ith day. The CRSP value-weighted return index (including all distributions) was used to calculate abnormal returns. 
where MVT it and MVB it are the market value of equity of the target and bidder firms associated with merger i on day t . . We find that targets gain value (mean 15.45%, median 14.04%), bidders do not gain (mean -1.12%, median -1.85%), and these large mergers result in a mean (median) combined change in bidder and target shareholder wealth of 1.70%
(0.63%).
III. POST MERGER CHANGES IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
For the 97 sample mergers we obtain compensation data from proxy statements, 10-Ks, and other sources for at least the top five executives (including the CEO) for both target and bidder banks at the merger announcement. We collect data for the year before the merger announcement for both bidder and target banks and for and the year-end after the merger completion date for the combined bank. 10 We collect additional background , and all other long-term compensation. In addition, we also collect data on stock options, including the number of options awarded that year and the option value. Option value is determined by the firm either as "grant date present value" or the potential realizable value at 5% and 10% annual rates of stock appreciation for the option term.
Below is a sample description of the "grant date present value" of all options granted in the last fiscal year for the top executives from X Bancorp. While both cash and total compensation (which includes long-term compensation)
increase after merger, the proportionate change in the latter is substantially larger than the change in the former. Mean (median) long-term compensation as a proportion of total compensation increases from 28.9% (35.3%) to 42.1% (43.0%) after the merger, and ttests for differences between the mean long-term to total compensation ratio pre merger versus post merger are significant at better than the 1% level. 13 The ultimate value of long-term compensation, composed of stock options and long-term incentive payouts, depends on future performance and the realization of merger gains. Mehran (1995) provides evidence suggesting that the incentive provided by equity-based compensation apparently leads to better performance at non-financial firms. With respect to the banking sector, Crawford, Ezzell, and Miles (1995) and Hubbard and Palia (1995) report that material changes in banks' operating environments due to deregulation also prompt increases in incentive pay. Consequently, one interpretation of the disproportionately large increase in total compensation is an efficient recontracting with the CEO to provide him with incentives for improved firm performance and realization of merger gains. In short, the merger represents a material change in the nature of the organization requiring proportionately more incentives for performance.
Panels B through D of Table III classify the sample banks on post merger CEO status.
These categories include no change in CEO, change in CEO, and mergers where the CEO shares power after the merger is completed (i.e., in some cases, the CEO gives up the title of Chairman to another executive). It is possible for a merger to be listed in multiple categories. For example, if a firm experienced no turnover in CEO, but a power-sharing arrangement occurred, then that merger would be listed in both the no-change and powersharing categories. Panel B of Table III Specifically, for new CEOs cash and total compensation increase by a mean (median) of 61% (30%) and 103% (84%), respectively, compared to their predecessors' levels.
Changes in cash and total compensation at a lower level are observed for continuing
CEOs for whom mean (median) percentage changes are 45% (28%) and 90% (71%)
respectively. These differences prove statistically significant in a multivariate framework where we control for bank and merger characteristics (we omit these results for brevity).
This finding suggests that continuing CEOs do not experience increases in salary greater than observed for newly hired CEOs and is consistent with the results from Berry, Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen (2001). Instead, changes in compensation for incumbent CEOs are comparable to or smaller than those required when the board contracts with a new CEO.
In other words, the compensation terms required to recruit a new CEO following a merger are roughly mirrored in the restructuring of incumbents' compensation packages.
This seems indicative of efficient managerial labor markets rather than board capture, entrenchment, self-dealing, or other explanations based on inadequate governance.
Power sharing between executives from both the bidder and target bank may be an indication that the integration of the banks' respective assets or personnel could be especially difficult and managerial discretion in realizing merger gains is especially that if there is a potential for an increase in compensation, an executive will get the deal done even if it means sharing power).
IV. COMPENSATION CHANGES AND EXPECTED GAINS FROM MERGER
In this section we investigate the extent to which bank-specific and CEO-specific These merger gains could b e obtained from organizational efficiencies, product and geographic diversification, cost savings, and revenue enhancements. Indeed, the combined announcement return can be viewed not only as the market's view on combining two banks' assets but also the v alue of reassigning the target assets to the control of bidder management. Managerial talent and effort must be directed at turning these expectations into reality, and consequently a restructuring of managerial incentives commensurate with the magnitude of the potential gains might be expected.
Before presenting multivariate analysis, we first compare compensation changes for samples of firms distinguished by our measure of expected merger gains and by the relative size of target assets to bidder assets. Again, the results in Bliss and Rosen (2001) suggest that compensation changes are related to target assets. In Table IV we segment our sample of 97 bank mergers into quadrants based on relative target size (below median vs. above median) and by our measure of value enhancement due to merger (below median vs. above median). Holding value enhancement from the merger constant, there appears to be no reliable relation between relative target size and changes in compensation. Specifically, tests for differences in means for compensation changes after acquisitions of relatively large targets versus acquisitions of small targets fail to reject the null hypothesis of no difference. Holding relative target size steady, however, changes in compensation appear to be higher following mergers with above median merger gains versus those with below median gains. The p-values associated with tests for differences in means are relatively small but still not significant at conventional levels for all comparisons, however.
14 Perhaps this is to be expected given the small sample size in each quadrant, the variation in compensation levels across sample banks, and our failure to include bank-specific variables such as pre merger asset size of the bidder bank and post merger changes in operational performance.
We next conduct multivariate regression analysis that relates changes in compensation to bank and CEO characteristics. We measure changes in compensation as the difference between the log of compensation after the merger and the log of compensation before the merger. This specification is similar to that used by Avery, Chevalier, and Schaefer (1998) in their study of acquisitions by firms in non-financial sectors.
15 Table V If, however, bank CEOs are rewarded for enhancements to bank profitability we would expect the coefficient estimate for change in ROA to be positive, especially so for cash compensation that is likely to include the current year's performance bonus. Most importantly, if changes in compensation are related to expectations of gains from merger we expect the coefficient on combined market value returns to be positive. In addition to these variables we also report specifications that include the change in the number of bank employees, a geographic focus variable based on whether or not the headquarters of the target and acquirer bank are in different states, and age, tenure, and shareholding of the bidder CEO. 16, 17 Table VIa shows that the change in log cash compensation is positively but insignificantly related to the log of bidder assets (coefficient of 0.113, p-value = 12%) and the log of target assets (coefficient of 0.059, p-value = 20%). The F -test for this specification nevertheless has a p -value of 2%, suggesting that target and bidder assets jointly explain some of the variation in cash compensation.
Regression #2 of Table VIa The final two specifications (regressions #4 and #5) substitute merger announcement returns to bidder shareholders for combined bank value changes. In regression #4 the coefficient on bidder returns is positive yet indistinguishable from zero (0.940, p-value = 28%), but the coefficient on change in ROA is positive and significant (0.211, p-value=3%). In regression #5, which includes other explanatory variables, the coefficient on bidder returns is positive and marginally significant (1.58, p-value = 10%).
The only other variable that is related to the change in cash compensation is the change in employees, which is only significant in regression #5. This could be interpreted as a size effect indicative of empire building. On the other hand, the change in a bank's labor force can be interpreted as a scope or scale of management measure, over which CEO managerial productivity is leveraged. 18, 19 Other firm and manager-specific variables, including our measure of geographic diversification, do not seem to explain the change in post merger cash compensation. 20, 21 Notably, the log of target assets is indistinguishable from zero across all regressions involving cash compensation changes reported in Table VIa . Thus we fail to find support for Bliss and Rosen's inference that increases in size due to merger lead to cash compensation increases. Rather, the findings reported in Table VIa suggest that our proxy for expected merger gains positively affects changes in cash compensation.
The economic significance of the effect of merger gains on cash compensation is not directly discernable from the coefficient estimates in Table VIa , largely due to our specification of the dependent variable as the change in the log of cash compensation.
We can use the coefficient estimates, say from regression # 3 for instance, to calculate the implications for cash compensation. If we assume a manager has median cash compensation before the merger ($1,155 thousand) and engages in a merger that produces value gains at the 75 th percentile of the distribution (5.63%), his cash compensation is predicted to increase by about $169 thousand. 22 If such a manager instead engages in a merger that results in value gains at the 25 th percentile (-2.85%), his cash compensation is predicted to decrease by $77 thousand. This implied difference in cash compensation ($246 thousand) based on expected value enhancements from the merger appears economically significant. Table VIb reports similar regression specifications but for change in log total compensation as the dependent variable. The coefficient estimates for log of bidder assets are positive in all specifications, yet only significant when the additional bank and CEO characteristics are omitted (regressions #1, #2, and #4). Consistent with our findings for cash compensation, the coefficient estimates for log of target assets are never statistically distinguishable from zero and are actually negative in all specifications.
Coefficient estimates on change in ROA are positive but never distinguishable from zero.
This suggests that, unlike cash compensation, the long-term compensation component imbedded in total compensation is largely independent of short-term accounting performance. The coefficients on combined value enhancement for bidder and target banks are positive and statistically distinguishable from zero for both regressions #2 and #3. The coefficient estimate on bidder returns is also positive, but marginally significant only in regression #4. Coefficient estimates on other bank-specific and CEO-specific variables are not distinguishable from zero and do not improve model performance as measured by adjusted R-squared.
Again, the economic magnitude of the effect of expected gains from merger on total compensation is difficult to discern from Table VIb. Using the coefficient estimate from regression # 3 in Table VIb , total compensation is predicted to decrease by about $142 thousand for a CEO who has median total compensation before the merger ($1,667 thousand) and engages in a merger that produces value gains at the 25 th percentile of the distribution ( -2.85%). 23 If such a manager instead engages in a merger that results in gains at the 75 th percentile (5.63%), total compensation is predicted to increase by $321 thousand, or $463 thousand more than if the merger gains were at the 25 th percentile.
Therefore, the impact of expected value enhancement from the merger appears economically significant with respect to total compensation, although it seems to explain less of the observed dispersion in total compensation than it does for cash compensation.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A cross-sectional relation between firm size and executive compensation is Our results, of course, do not support the sweeping conclusions that all bank mergers create value or that all post merger managerial pay raises are well deserved. Our results do suggest, however, that observed patterns in CEO compensation following bank mergers are consistent with markets for corporate control and managerial labor that provide incentives for banks to merge and for bank managers to realize potential gains from merger.
Table I Summary Data on Sample Bank Mergers
This table provides summary data for a sample of 97 bank mergers from 1990-1997. Panel A details summary statistics on firm value. Panel B provides cumulative abnormal returns for targets and bidders, and changes in combined firms market values. Bank mergers are: all completed acquisitions of any banking firm (with an SIC code = 612_, 671_) listed on the CRSP tapes denoted by a delist code in the 200s or 300s with assets greater than or equal to one billion dollars prior to the merger announcement. The number of mergers is determined based on the year of the announcement date. The value of a merger is determined by multiplying the number of shares outstanding times the price of the stock at completion of a merger as defined in articles from various financial sources. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated over a seven-day event window (-5, +1) around the initial announcement date. Combined Market Value Returns are based on the relative return (adjusted for firm size) of the target and bidder firms around the merger announcement event window. Geometric cumulative abnormal returns are found by multiplying the product of that day's abnormal return times the previous cumulative product, ((1+ar i )*(1+ar i-1 )), and then subtracting off one from the final product, where ar i is the ith day abnormal return and ar i-1 is the cumulative product of all the days abnormal returns prior to the ith day. The CRSP value-weighted return index (including all distributions) was used to calculate abnormal returns. 
Table II Assets of Bank Merger Participants
This table provides summary statistics on assets for a sample of 97 bank mergers from 1990-1997. Bank mergers are all completed acquisitions of any banking firm (with an SIC code = 612_, 671_) listed on the CRSP tapes denoted by a delist code in the 200s or 300s with both bidder and target assets greater than or equal to one billion dollars prior t o the merger announcement. Asset values are determined from Compustat, Lexis-Nexis, Edgar On-line, 10-Ks, and other financial sources. Average ratio of assets acquired is target assets divided by bidder assets. Target Assets / Assets of all Banks by Year is target assets divided by total target plus bidder assets for that year, while Target Assets /Assets of all Banks is target assets divided by total target and bidder assets. Total number of all mergers is the number of all public bank mergers announced each year between 1990-1997, regardless of target or bidder firm size. 
Year

Table III Compensation for Top Executives
This table provides compensation data for top executives for a sample of 97 bank mergers from 1990-1997. Bank mergers are all completed acquisitions of any banking firm (with an SIC code = 612_, 671_) listed on the CRSP tapes denoted by a delist code in the 200s or 300s with assets over one billion dollars prior to the merger announcement. Panel A details compensation for all CEOs (n = 97). Panel B provides compensation for firms where the CEO did not change from before the merger announcement to after the merger completion (n = 86). Panel C shows compensation for firms where the CEO changed from before to after the merger (n = 11). Panel D denotes compensation for mergers where the CEO from before the merger announcement must share control with another executive after (n = 10). Cash compensation ($ 000's) is defined as annual salary plus bonus and other annual compensation. Total compensation ($ 000's) is defined as cash compensation plus the value of stock options, long-term incentive payouts, and all other long-term compensation granted during the prior year. Long-term to total compensation is long-term compensation (total -cash compensation) divided by total compensation. 
Pre
Table III (continued) Compensation for Top Executives
Pre
Table IV Change in Compensation by Merger Gains and Relative Target Size
This table examines changes in compensation among the top executives of 97 banks that undertake mergers from 1990-1997 based on differences in wealth creation (value) and relative target size. Firm Value Enhancement is based on combined market value returns calculated as the daily changes in the sum of target and bidder firms' market values over a seven-day window (-5, +1) around the initial merger announcement date, thereby taking into account the relative size of the two merging banks. Relative Target Size is based on the ratio of pre merger target to bidder assets. All compensation variables before the merger are as of the year-end prior to the merger announcement date and for after the merger are as of the year-end end after the closing date. Mean and median (in parenthesis) values are reported. Tests of statistical significance, t-statistics or p-values, are indicated by asterisks where *, **, *** indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. For median returns, p-values are based on the Wilcoxon signed rank test used to indicate if the median value is statistically different from zero. For changes in cash and total compensation, differences between groups are calculated. For mean returns, a p-value of the t-test measuring differences in returns is reported. 
Target Assets/Bidder Assets
Table V Summary Statistics of Regression Variables
This table provides summary statistics for regression variables for a sample of 97 bank mergers from 1990-1997. Target Assets are target firm assets ($ billions) year-end prior to the initial merger announcement date. Bidder Assets are year-end bidder assets ($ billions) prior to the merger announcement. ∆ ROA is the change in bidder return on assets from before the merger to after. Combined Market Value Returns are calculated as the daily changes in the sum of target and bidder firms' market values over a seven-day window (-5, +1) around the initial merger announcement date, thereby taking into account the relative size of the two merging banks. Bidder Returns are cumulative abnormal returns calculated over a seven-day event window (-5, +1) around the initial announcement date. Geometric cumulative abnormal returns are found by multiplying the product of that day's abnormal return times the previous cumulative product, ((1+ar i )*(1+ar i-1 )), and then subtracting off one from the final product, where ar i is the ith day abnormal return and ar i-1 is the cumulative product of all the days abnormal returns prior to the ith day. The CRSP value-weighted return index (including all distributions) was used to calculate abnormal returns. ∆ Employees is the change in the number of bidder employees from before the merger to after. % Ownership represents the number of shares held by the CEO divided by total shares outstanding times 1,000,000. HQ Same equals one when bidder and target headquarters are in the same state. Age is the age of the CEO prior to the merger. Tenure Bidder Before is the tenure of the CEO on the executive committee up to the year-end prior to the merger announcement. Table Va , the dependent variable is the change in the log value of cash compensation while in Table Vb , the dependent variable is the change in the log value of total compensation. Log Target Assets are the log of year-end target assets ($ billions) prior to the merger announcement. Log Bidder Assets log of year-end bidder assets ($ billions) prior to the merger announcement. ∆ ROA is the change in bidder return on assets from before the merger to after. Combined Market Value Returns are calculated as the daily changes in the sum of target and bidder firms' market values over a seven-day window (-5, +1) around the initial merger announcement date, thereby taking into account the relative size of the two merging banks. Bidder Returns are cumulative abnormal returns calculated over a seven-day event window (-5, +1) around the initial announcement date. Geometric cumulative abnormal returns are found by multiplying the product of that day's abnormal return times the previous cumulative product, ((1+ar i )*(1+ar i-1 )), and then subtracting off one from the final product, where ar i is the ith day abnormal return and ar i-1 is the cumulative product of all the days abnormal returns prior to the ith day. The CRSP value-weighted return index (including all distributions) was used to calculate abnormal returns. ∆ Employees is the change in the number of bidder employees from before the merger to after. % Ownership represents the number of shares held by CEO divided by total shares outstanding times 1,000,000. HQ Same equals one when bidder and target headquarters are in the same state. Age is the age of the CEO prior to the merger times 1,000. Tenure Bidder Before is the tenure of the CEO on the executive committee up to the year-end prior to the merger announcement. All compensation variables before the merger are as of the year-end prior to the merger announcement date and for after the merger are as of the year-end end after the closing date. P-values are in parentheses. (2001) formulate a simple version of this notion: "Also, managing a bigger firm might involve more skill than managing a smaller firm. . . . These expla nations for the correlation between compensation and size imply that better managers control bigger firms, not that making a firm larger should increase the compensation of an existing manager" (p. 112). 3 Hugh McColl, formerly of NationsBank (now Bank of America) is perhaps the most well known example of a CEO who rapidly expanded his bank via mergers, often evoking praise (see The Wall Street Journal, April 17, 1995, B3) and sometimes attracting criticism (see The Economist, January 27, 2001, 71-72). 4 This sample is a subset of that in Becher (2000) where the author provides a more detailed description of the variables collected and a thorough explanation of firms excluded. 5 6 These asset criteria are due, in part, to the difficulty in obtaining data for firms with less than $1 billion in assets. Most of these smaller firms are traded on the NASDAQ Bulletin Board system (infrequent trades with no return data) and do not have much public information available (a search of the SEC archives reveals that many do not have SEC filings). 7 Becher and Campbell (2001) find similar results for a sample of 443 bank mergers from 1990-1999. Moreover, Becher (2000) documents that, for a sample of banks that have at least one unsuccessful takeover attempt from 1980-1997, almost all of these banks were eventually acquired, completed a merger of equals, or went out of business within the next few years. Thus, focusing on successful bids only is not likely an issue in this analysis. 8 Cumulative abnormal returns were also calculated using the following: an arithmetic process, an equal weighted market index, a market model -120 day to -30 days before the announcement window, and event windows of different lengths without qualitatively changing the results. 9 We also calculate combined firm returns as a weighted average of pre merger market value as outlined in Houston and Ryngaert (1994). where MVT i and MVB i are the market value of equity of the ith target and bidder firm five days before the initial announcement date, and CART i and CARB i are the cumulative abnormal returns for the ith target and bidder firm over the seven-day event window (-5, +1). Results from regression analyses were qualitatively the same and are not included to save space. 10 If t -1 statements are not available, then same-year statements are used only if the data are compiled before the initial announcement date. Otherwise, data from t -2 filings are obtained. Similarly, if t +1 filings are not available, same-year statements are used on if the data are compiled after the merger. Otherwise, data from t +2 filing are used.
Variables
Combined Cumulative Abnormal Returns
